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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Since this is a criminal case not involving a first degree felony, this Court has 
appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Appellee is satisfied with appellant's Statement of the Issues and therefore 
does not submit its own Statement of the Issues. See Rule 24(b)( 1) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee is satisfied with appellant's Statement of the Case and therefore 
does not submit its own Statement of the Case. See Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At about 2:00 a.m. on July 23,2003 appellant arrived with his mother at the 
emergency room ("ER") of Salt Lake L.D.S. Hospital. (Rl 55:55). As appellant entered 
through the sliding glass doors he was yelling at his mother and had blood on his 
clothing and on his left hand, and the tip of his left pinky finger was cut or possibly 
missing. (Rl 55:55, 96). Appellant had received his injury during a fight with his 
brother during which his brother also sprayed mace into his eyes. (R15 5:144). Officer 
Thomas Vu ("Officer Vu") of the Salt Lake City Police Department ("SLCPD") was 
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wearing his SLCPD uniform while working as a part-time security guard for the 
hospital. Officer Vu is permitted to wear his SLCPD uniform by his department while 
working part-time security. (Rl 55:75). Officer Vu was not on duty for SLCPD and 
was being paid by the hospital for his security-guard services. (R155:63). Amid a 
loud, rude, obnoxious stream of profanity from appellant, an admissions tech got 
appellant's name from him and returned to her desk. (R155:81). After that Officer Vu 
met appellant in the reception area and asked whether appellant needed medical 
attention, to which appellant said, "F*** you. I need to see a doctor, not a P**ing 
cop." (Rl55:57, 81). Officer Vu requested appellant to calm down so he could be 
triaged before seeing a doctor, to which appellant said a second time, "F*** you. I 
need to see a doctor, not a f***ing cop," which was heard throughout the ER area. 
(R155:57, 83, 85). While appellant sat in triage Officer Vu confirmed appellant was 
the subject of a prior domestic violence dispatch that he heard about thirteen minutes 
prior to appellant's arrival at the hospital. Officer Vu requested back-up police 
assistance. (Rl 55:58). At the same time Officer Vu overheard appellant say two times 
that when he got out of the hospital he was going to kill his brother who cut him. 
(Rl 55:58). Appellant continued to yell out, demand to be seen by only a doctor and to 
direct profanity at Officer Vu. (R155:59). Officer Vu then asked the charge nurse, 
who was wearing green scrubs and an identification badge, to talk with appellant. 
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When the charge nurse approached, appellant took a stand with clenched fists and 
yelled at the charge nurse, "F*** you, a**hole," He then made threatening moves 
toward Officer Vu and the charge nurse, and threatened to "kick our asses." (Rl 55:60, 
71, 93,94, 99). Appellant's behav or made it impossible for the charge nurse to take 
his blood pressure and screen for allergies. (Rl 55:97). After that Officer Vu thought 
it best to take appellant under control to prevent appellant from hitting him or the 
charge nurse. As he took hold of appellant's left arm, appellant with his right arm 
swung a punch at Officer Vu but missed contact because Officer Vu avoided it. 
(R155:61,72). After that, "because of [appellant's] size and stuff," Officer Vu decided 
to take appellant to the ground where there would be a better chance of bringing him 
under control (R155:61). During the take down Officer Vu was initially assisted by 
the charge nurse while appellant swung and kicked at both of them, so Officer Vu 
kicked appellant a couple of times and appellant "just kept fighting and fighting with 
the officer and the nurse." (Rl 55:84,99). With the assistance of the charge nurse and 
an E.R. doctor and another E.R. employee, Officer Vu was able to handcuff appellant's 
hands and feet, (R155:61, 162), after which the stream of profanity continued, along 
with appellant's threat to use his priesthood power to invoke God's revenge on the four 
who subdued him within one week. (Rl55:62). At some point during the struggle 
appellant's mother was knocked from her chair to the floor and chipped one of her 
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vertebrae. (Rl 55:149, 150). After appellant was taken under control police backup 
arrived and hospital staff determined appellant's finger injury was "not life threatening 
in any way." (R155:100, 101). Appellant still seemed "wild" and "crazy" in his 
thoughts and his "verbal actions" toward Officer Vu and the hospital staff to the extent 
he could not be treated. (R155:100, 101). The four or five SLCPD backup officers 
then took appellant outside to sit on the sidewalk for thirty minutes or more, after 
which appellant agreed to a sedative, whereupon he was treated for his cut finger. 
(Rl 55:101, 102). Appellant was charged by information with three counts: Count 1: 
Assault on a Health Care Provider - Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.7, Count 2: Assault 
on a Police Officer - Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4, and Count 3: Disorderly Conduct 
- Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102. After the City put on its case in chief consisting of the 
evidence above, appellant moved for a directed verdict on Counts 1 and 2, both the 
Assault charges. The trial court denied both motions, after which appellant put on his 
case and all three counts were submitted to the jury. During closing argument 
appellant's defense counsel argued that appellant may not have been able to form intent 
because he was hallucinating, a point which the City disputes below, but she did not 
raise the mental illness defense nor was it part of this trial: "Now, one.. .big element in 
this is knowing that the person was a police officer .... Paul [appellant] got up and 
said it could have been three cops, it could have been four.... [S]o, he doesn't really 
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remember. Mom [appellant's mother] has testified he's different. He's not thinking 
straight, he ... doesn't remember because he's in shock and he has no idea what's 
going on. ... Probably knew it was a police officer because he said, ... I want a 
doctor, I don't want a f***ing cop; so he probably knew he was a police officer. ... 
[H]ave they proved what he knows? No. Because all the testimony has been that he's 
hallucinating and he's different, and so have they proved that? No." (R155:194). This 
vague assertion of what appellant on appeal argues was or should have been a mental 
illness defense was not an issue at trial. The prosecutor's sum total response to this 
vague assertion was this: "Additionally, I want to point out to you that him, you know, 
not remembering that—what happened that day and him hallucinating, is—is not a 
defense for what occurred here today [sic]." (Rl 55:197). After closing arguments the 
case went to the jury and they acquitted on the Assault on a Healthcare Worker charge, 
and convicted on both Assault on a Peace Officer and Disorderly Conduct. (Rl 55:199, 
200). Appellant appealed, making three arguments: (1) The trial court erred as a matter 
of law by ruling Officer Vu acted within the scope of his employment as a police 
officer while working as part-time security for the hospital; (2) Appellant's counsel at 
trial were ineffective because they did not raise a mental illness defense and because 
they did not object to the alleged prosecutor misconduct; (3) The prosecutor's 
argument that appellant's lack of memory and putative hallucinations were not a 
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defense was prosecutor misconduct. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I; The trial court's ruling that Officer Vu was acting within the scope of 
his authority as a police officer while employed in his secondary employment as a 
private security guard is consistent with the law in other jurisdictions which have ruled 
on this issue. 
Point II: Appellant's interwoven mental illness (or insanity) argument and 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument presumes there was evidence of mental 
illness, and requires a threshold fact-finding on appeal that appellant was mentally ill 
when he assaulted Officer Vu. 
Once appellant persuades this Court on appeal of that fact, appellant seeks to 
have this Court evaluate defense trial counsel's performance against that appellate 
finding of mental illness, and thereafter to rule that trial counsel in the court below was 
ineffective by not raising the mental illness defense, and by not objecting to the 
prosecutor's statement that the mental illness defense was not before the jury. Asking 
this Court to make a finding of fact on appeal and then asking this Court to evaluate 
trial counsel's performance in view of that appellate finding is not proper, and even if 
it were proper, there is no evidence in the record to suggest appellant was mentally ill 
(or insane) on the early morning in question. 
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In addition, appellant has not perfected his appeal under Rule 23B of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate procedure. 
Point HI: The trial prosecutor did not commit prosecutor misconduct because 
the prosecutor correctly stated the law of the case. ,ven if the prosecutor did misstate 
the law, the trial court cured that misstatement. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT OFFICER VU ACTED 
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY AS A PEACE OFFICER 
WAS CORRECT. 
A. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.4 contemplates that an off-duty police 
officer may act within the scope of his authority for the purpose of assault 
on a peace officer. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.4 provides in pertinent part: 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace 
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority 
as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Id 
Whether Officer Vu is a peace officer is not in question or disputed. Regarding 
whether appellant had the requisite knowledge that Officer Vu is a peace officer, the 
facts are conclusive: Officer Vu was in his distinct SLCPD uniform designed to inform 
others of his identity (R155:63) and appellant himself identified Officer Vu two times 
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as a peace officer in colloquial terms: "F*** you. I need to see a doctor, not a p**ing 
cop." (R155:57,81). 
The only question under this point is whether the trial court erred when it ruled 
that Officer Vu was "acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer" even 
though he was off-duty and working in his secondary employment as a private security 
guard. (R155:138). The thrust of appellant's argument seems to be that since Officer 
Vu was off-duty, he cannot have been acting within the scope of his authority as a 
police officer when he was assaulted. 
Although this question has not been addressed directly in Utah, many other 
jurisdictions have concluded in factually similar cases that police officers moonlighting 
for private employers as security guards are engaged in official duties for the purposes 
of officer assault statutes when, during the course of such secondary employment, they 
react to incidents of what may be criminal or disorderly conduct. 
Before discussing those cases, Justice Stewart's dissenting discussion of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-102.4 in State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), in which he 
recounted the then recent legislative history of that statute, militates toward the 
conclusion that an off-duty police officer can act within the scope of his authority as a 
police officer while off-duty on a purely statutory analysis: 
The legislative history of the assault [on a police officer] statute gives guidance 
in construing that provision. A 1987 amendment to that statute indicates a 
legislative intent to make an assault on an officer a crime only when the officer 
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is acting within his or her authority. It is not enough to show that an officer was 
on duty and performing his [or her] duties. Prior to the 1987 amendment, the 
assault statute read: Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge 
that he is on duty, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
102.4 (1978). The amendment made clear thait being "on duty" was not 
sufficient. The amended statute now reads: Any person who assaults a peace 
officer, with knowledge that he is a peace officer,, < J when the peace officer is 
acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Id. at 576-77 (emphasis added). It is clear from the amendment that the legislature 
intended to expand the reach of the statute to make it a class A misdemeanor to assault 
an off-duty officer. Formerly the statute required a defendant to know whether an 
officer was on duty; now it requires only knowledge that he or she is a police officer, 
regardless whether he or she is on or off-duty. That interpretation is consistent with 
the applicable case law from other jurisdictions discussed below. 
B. Case law from other jurisdictions supports the trial court's ruling that 
Officer Vu was acting within the scope of his authority when appellant 
swung a punch at him and otherwise assaulted him. 
In State v. Wilen, 539 N.W.2d 650 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995), a peace officer was 
working in a secondary employment capacity as a security guard at a Hardee's fast-
food restaurant while wearing her official police uniform, sidearm, police badge and 
police radio, Hardee's, rather than the police department, compensated her for this 
secondary employment. Id at 655. During the course of investigating an accident on 
the Hardee's lot the defendant tried to ram or run over the officer and was charged with 
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attempted second degree assault on a police officer. The sole issue on appeal was 
"clarifying when an officer is engaged in performance of his or her official duties" 
under Nebraska statute. IdL at 656-57. 
In ruling the off-duty officer was engaged in performance of her official duties, 
the Wilen court noted that the "many other jurisdictions" which have ruled consistently 
with the trial court in the instant matter have analyzed the question of "official duties" 
under a test which examines "the nature of the secondary employment and the nature 
of the acts being performed at the time of the incident." Id. at 658. The Wilen court 
described this inquiry as being a three-pronged examination into "(1) the specific 
nature, extent, and circumstances of the secondary employment; (2) the manner in 
which such secondary employment is regarded by the employer and employee; (3) the 
nature of the acts the peace officer-victim is performing at the time in question." Id. 
Under the first prong, i.e., the specific nature, extent, and circumstances of the 
secondary employment, the court first discussed "off-duty conduct generally" to place 
secondary employment into context. IcL at 658, 660. 
Prong 1(a): Primary employment and off-duty conduct generally. The court 
noted that under the common law a person whose primary employment is that of a 
police officer has certain powers, rights and duties both on and off duty. In connection 
with off-duty obligations, the court noted a police officer is not relieved of his on-duty 
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obligations and responsibilities: 
A police officer on "off-duty" status is nevertheless not relieved of the 
obligation as an officer to preserve the public peace and to protect the lives and 
property of the citizens of the public in general. Indeed, police officers are 
considered to be under a duty to respond as police officers 24 hours a day. 
id., (quoting EUGENE MCQUILLIN ET AL., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 
45.15 at 123 (3d. ed. 1992)). The court further noted that, "it has been widely held 
that a police officer is not relieved of his or her obligation to preserve the peace while 
off duty/5 that the Nebraska statute describing police officer duties did not "distinguish 
between the authority and obligations of police officers on or off duty or in or out of 
uniform/' concluding that "under proper circumstances, police officers have a duty to 
preserve the peace and to respond as peace officers at all times." Id at 559-60. The 
court then applied that conclusion to secondary employment. 
Prong 1(b): Secondary employment. The court stated that its analysis described 
above indicated that "a police officer retains his or her police officer status, even while 
off duty in a secondary employment capacity, unless it is clear from the nature of the 
officer's activities that he or she is acting exclusively in a private capacity or is 
engaging in his or her own private business." Wilen, 539 N.W.2d at 660. In addition, 
sound public policy supports the practice of private establishments employing 
uniformed, off-duty police officers to keep peace and security: 
[The] practice of municipalities which allows law enforcement officers, while 
off duty and in uniform, to serve as peace-keepers in private establishments 
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open to the general public is in the public interest. The presence of uniformed 
officers in places susceptible to breaches of the peace deters unlawful acts and 
conduct by patrons in those places. The public knows the uniform and the 
badge stand for the authority of the government. The public generally knows 
that law enforcement officers have the duty to serve and protect them at all 
times. ... [A] defendant will be charged with knowledge of the uniformed 
officer's official status where circumstances warrant. ... An official uniform 
implies an official status.... 
Id 
This is true even where "knowledge of [a] police officer's official status" is 
"inferred" from a defendant's observation of a "uniform or badge" but no verbal 
disclosure is made by the police officer. Id. In addition, "the public expects that a 
uniformed law enforcement officer has the power to enforce the law and to arrest 
where necessary, powers which a private security guard generally does not possess." 
Id. Applying that analysis to the Wilen facts, the court stated that "the functions [the 
officer] performed for Hardee's, in general and on the evening in question, are 
consistent with the powers and duties of her primary employment as a law enforcement 
officer for the City of [her jurisdiction]." Similarly in the instant case, Officer Vu's 
actions of attempting to calm down appellant, and then, when appellant became 
threatening to the charge nurse, to physically take him under control and eventually 
arrest him, were functions consistent with the powers and duties of his primary 
employment as a law enforcement officer with SLCPD, i.e., to preserve the public 
peace and to protect the lives of citizens. 
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Prong 2: The manner in which such secondary employment is regarded by the 
employer and employee: The court stated the officer's duties to her secondary 
employer were supplemental to her primary employment as a peace officer and her 
attendant duties to keep the peace, which is universally regarded as official law 
enforcement duty: 
It is clear that [the officer] performed duties for Hardee's that were 
supplemental to her primary duties of law enforcement on behalf of the general 
public. The fact that [the officer] received compensation from Hardee's, along 
with her salary from public employment, is of no consequence. Pursuant to her 
primary employment with the city ... her ultimate duty was to enforce the law 
and ensure the safety of the public at large. The record suggests that Hardee's 
hired [the officer] and other police officers on the basis of their official status 
and the advantages this status would provide in their peacekeeping function. 
While [the officer's] primary official status and secondary services benefited 
Hardee's, her goal always was to keep the peace, universally regarded as an 
official law enforcement duty. 
Id. Similarly in the instant case, Officer Vu' s duties to the hospital were supplemental 
to those of his duties of law enforcement to the general public. As in Wilen, the fact 
that he was paid by the hospital should be of no consequence. Additionally, as in 
Wilen, it seems axiomatic that the hospital hired Officer Vu because of his official 
status as a SLCPD peace officer and for the advantages that official status would 
provide. While Officer Vu's primary official status and secondary services benefited 
the hospital, his goal was always to meet his law enforcement duty, which he did on 
the night in question. It was to Officer Vu, fully uniformed, that the hospital looked 
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for peace keeping functions, and it was Officer Vu who appellant punched and kicked 
at, and appellant should be charged with, or have imputed to him, the knowledge of 
Officer Vu's official status. 
Prong 3: The nature of the acts the peace officer-victim is performing at the 
time in question: The Wilen court noted that [the officer] "responded to and 
investigated the accident in an official and professional manner[,]... testified in detail 
regarding her observations of [defendant's] possible state of intoxication[,]" which 
testimony "was comparable to that of police officers in criminal ... cases generally" 
without regard to on-duty or off-duty status. In the instant case, the nature of the acts 
Officer Vu performed in seeking to calm appellant and then taking him under control 
are more than comparable to actions he would routinely take in a situation involving 
assaultive or disorderly conduct to which a peace officer responds, they are 
indistinguishable from such actions. 
A different analytical approach is found in State v. Graham, 927 P.2d 227 
(Wash. 1996). There two off-duty police officers wearing police bicycle patrol 
uniforms were working as private security guards when they noticed defendant 
carrying a large sum of money and what appeared to be a baggie of rock cocaine. Id at 
229. When the officers spoke to defendant he ran from them, after which the officers 
caught him while he tried to get into a taxi and defendant flailed, kicked and screamed 
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at the officers. Id. He was arrested for resisting arrest and obstructing a public servant. 
Id 
On appeal defendant argued that a uniformed off-duty police officer working as 
a private security guard could not be a public servant performing official duties fo/ 'he 
purposes of the obstructing statute and was not a peace officer for the purposes of the 
resisting statute. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that a police officer, whether 
on or off duty, was a public servant and a peace officer. Id at 230. It also found that 
the officers stepped out of their roles as private security guards and into their roles as 
police officers when the stopped defendant. Id. 
In affirming the court of appeals, the Washington Supreme Court, as a threshold 
matter held that "an off duty police officer is a public servant, with the authority to 
respond to emergencies and to react to criminal conduct." Id at 231. The question 
was "whether an off-duty officer can discharge his or her "official" duties at the same 
time the officer is working as a private security guard." Id The court first reviewed 
the relevant case law discussing the policy underlying such an inquiry, noting that the 
cases indicate the inquiry is fact intensive to "determine whether the officer was acting 
on behalf of the private employer or, instead, was discharging his or her official 
powers and duties." Id (citing Tapp v. State, 406 N.E.2d 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (it 
is the nature of the acts performed and not whether the officer is on or off duty, in or 
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out of uniform, which determines whether the officer is engaged in the performance of 
his official duties). See also, State v. Robinson, 379 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) (an officer's "off-duty" status is not a limitation upon his right to exercise police 
authority in the presence of criminal activity); Williams v. State, 172 N.W.2d 31 (Wis. 
1969) (once officer became aware of fight and took actions to stop it, he was no longer 
off duty - stepping into a crowd to break up a fight was not a "personal frolic"). 
After that discussion the court stated its view that public policy is furthered by 
the rule that a police officer is a peace officer with authority to act as such whenever 
the officer reasonably believes that a crime is committed in his or her presence, 
whether the officer is on duty or off duty: 
In our view, public policy is furthered by the rule that a police officer is a public 
servant or peace officer who has the authority to act as a police officer whenever 
a crime is being committed whether on or off duty. This is particularly true 
when the officer is in uniform or when the officer is otherwise identified as a 
police officer. 
Graham, 927 P.2d at 233 (citing State v. De Santo, 410 A.2d 704 (N.J. Super. Ct App. 
Div., N.J. 1980) (the police uniform has the same significance to the public whether 
the officer is technically on or off duty). The court further stated that when the officers 
began acting as police officers rather than security guards, i.e., when the stopped 
defendant, they stepped out of their roles as security guards and into their roles as 
peace officers: 
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In the present case, the officers involved were in uniform and were armed. 
Their job as security guards was to patrol the streets, not to arrest drug 
offenders. ... They identified themselves as police officers and the defendant 
believed them to be police officers. ... When the officers stopped the 
defendant, they stepped out of their roles as security guards and into their roles 
as police officers. They were identified as police officers and their status as 
police officers wa- known to the defendant. The officers were acting as public 
servants who were discharging their official duties ... at the time they were 
involved with the defendant. 
Graham, 927 P.2d at 233. nl. Similarly, in the instant matter, Officer Vu was in 
uniform, he was at the hospital working as part-time security and among his duties was 
to ask people whether they need to see a doctor and whether they need help. (Rl 55:62, 
64, 65). n2. He was known by appellant to be a police officer: "F*** you. I need to 
nl See also. State v. Brown, 989 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (stating, "We agree 
with the reasoning of those cases which hold that ... an off-duty law enforcement 
officer employed as a private security guard is engaged in the performance of duties 
imposed on him by law."); State v. Sanchez, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2546 (Ohio 
Misc.) (holding that a police officer's "duties are not limited to times when Ihe police 
officer is officially on duty or 'on the clock"'); De Santo, 410 A.2d 704 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div., N.J. 1980) (notwithstanding defendant's claim that since uniformed 
police officer was being paid by a private company the most defendant could be 
convicted of was assault, the court upheld conviction of assault on peace officer, noting 
"the uniform has the same significance to the public whether the wearer is technically 
on or off duty.. ..in such a situation the municipality and its public expect and obtain 
real benefits from the police officer.") (internal brackets omitted). 
n2 There was no testimony either way about whether Officer Vu was armed, though it 
is safe to assume he was. Regardless, his being un-armed would not be harmful to the 
City's argument. See Williams v. State, 172 N.W.2d 31 (Wis. 1969) (where uniformed 
off-duty officer en route home after secondary employment as a security guard had 
removed his gun belt did not affect ruling that he was victim of assault on a peace 
officer when he got out of his private car to break up a fight). 
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see a doctor, not a f***ing cop." (R155:57). When appellant began his threatening 
behavior toward the charge nurse, and Officer Vu determined to take him under 
control, Officer Vu stepped out of his role as a security guard and into his role as a 
police officer. He was acting as a public servant who was discharging his official 
duties within the scope of his authority as a police officer, and this Court should so 
hold. 
There is another analytical point the City requests this Court to consider. 
Assume the following for the sake of discussion: Officer Vu was both off-duty and not 
working as part-time security for the hospital, but just happened to be there after work 
fully uniformed to pick up a prescription when he noticed appellant's disorderly and 
threatening behavior. Assume further that Officer Vu thereupon acted as he did in the 
instant case, first seeking to calm appellant and then determining it best to take 
appellant under control. In such a case, appellant could not plausibly argue that 
Officer Vu was acting outside the scope of his authority as a police officer. The 
analysis would be very straight forward, i.e., when Officer Vu observed the disorderly 
and threatening behavior and acted thereon, he would be stepping into his duty-bound 
role to keep or restore the public peace. The City, therefore, asks rhetorically, why 
should the analysis change simply because Officer Vu was working as private security 
for the hospital? 
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C. The terms "discharge of official powers," "official duties," and "scope of 
authority" are analogous for police officer assault statutes. 
It may fairly be asked whether the terms "discharge of official powers or duties," 
See Graham, 927 P.2d 227 (Wash. 1996), and "official duties," See Wilen, 539 N. W. 
2d 650 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995), are analogous to the term "scope of his authority" as 
stated in Utah's assault on a peace officer statute. In Olvmpia Child Dev. Ctr, Inc. et al 
v. City of Marysville, Tennessee, 1999 Tenn. App. Lexis 77 (Term. App. 1999), the 
court, inter alia, addressed the question, "[M]ust a police officer be on an official duty 
shift in order to be considered as acting "in the scope of his [sic] employment?"' Id. at 
f 8. This was a tort action arising where an off-duty police officer defendant driving a 
private car struck plaintiffs van while that off-duty officer was pursuing a third 
vehicle which was speeding. The court ruled that "we are of the opinion that an officer 
does not necessarily have to be on an official shift or "on the clock" to act within the 
scope of his or her employment." Id. at f9. Citing noted tort authorities Prosser and 
Keeton, the court supported its ruling by noting that the phrase "scope of 
employment": 
[R]efers to those acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is 
employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be 
regarded as methods... of carrying out the objectives of the employment. ... It 
has been said that ... the servant's conduct is within the scope of his 
employment if it is of the kind which he is employed to perform, occurs 
substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is actuated, at 
least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. 
20 
W. (citing W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 
70(5thed. 1984)); see also, United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241,245 (2d Cir. 1967 
(stating, "[Performance of official duties[ ] is simply acting within the scope of what 
the [federal narcotics] agent is employed to do."). 
In the instant case, Officer Vu's conduct of apprehending a disorderly and 
threatening person was directly connected to his duties to his primary employer 
SLCPD to keep the peace and protect citizens that they may be regarded as methods of 
carrying out the objectives of his primary employment. Further, given a peace 
officer's 24/7 responsibilities and duties as discussed above, Officer Vu's actions were 
within the authorized limits of time and space of his employment and were clearly 
actuated by a purpose to serve his master/primary employer. 
In addition, the City suggests that if this were a civil tort action, with appellant 
as a plaintiff for injuries suffered during the take down, appellant would likely be 
strenuously arguing that Officer Vu was carrying out his official duties as a peace 
officer and thus acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer so as to join 
a second deep-pocket employer - SLCPD - as a party to his civil tort action. 
Moreover, the Restatement Second of Agency provides that ato be within the 
scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that 
authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
21 
AGENCY § 229 (1958). Officer Vu's actions were clearly of the same general nature as 
that authorized by his employer SLCPD and thus were within the scope of authority 
under the Assault on a Peace Officer statute at issue here. 
D. Workers compensation analysis supports the City's argument that 
Officer Vu was acting within the scope of his authority and employment 
during his actions. 
City ofHialeah v.Weber, 491 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989), was a workers 
compensation case where a uniform wearing off-duty police officer claimant who was 
injured while working in his secondary weekend security guard job sought benefits 
from his primary employer police department for injuries sustained while quelling a 
vandalism incident. Id. at 1205. In upholding the order requiring the officer's primary 
employer police department to pay workers compensation benefits, the court held on 
the facts that "the evidence in this case establishes unequivocally that claimant was 
performing his job as a police officer for the City at the time of his injuries." Id. In 
addition, "claimant's injuries arose out of his actions in perfecting the arrest of persons 
committing [criminal] acts ...." Id. 
When Officer Vu began perfecting the arrest of appellant he was performing his 
job as a police officer and not as a private security guard, regardless whether the terms 
"scope of employment," "scope of authority" or "official duties" are used to describe 
his conduct. 
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E. Officer Vu was not on a "personal frolic." 
Appellant argues Officer Vu was engaged in a personal frolic when he sought to 
calm and then take appellant under control and arrest him. A claim that an off-duty 
police officer who engaged in police actions was on a personal frolic was made and 
rejected in Williams v. State, 172N.W.2d31 (Wis. 1969). There a police-uniformed, 
off-duty police officer was en route home in his private car after finishing working in 
his secondary employment as a part-time security guard when he drove by a fight or 
struggle on the sidewalk. Id. at 46. When the officer got out to break up the 
altercation he was assaulted. IdL at 46-47. Defendant argued the officer was not acting 
in his "official capacity/' citing the "personal frolic" language of United States v. 
Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2nd Cir. 1967). Id at 47-48. In rejecting that claim, the 
Williams court stated that in attempting to preserve the public peace and order the 
officer was not on a "personal frolic:" 
[W]hen he came onto the scene at the intersection he felt the fight had to be 
broken up .... It is true that Hill was not on duty when he first saw the fight. 
However, as soon as he became aware of the situation and took action he was no 
longer off duty. Hill did what any officer of the law is supposed to do, and 
attempted to preserve public peace and order. It was certainly no "personal 
frolic" for him to stop his car, step into the middle of a crowd and on his own, 
attempt to break up a fight. There is, therefore no merit in defendant's assertion 
that Hill was not acting in his official capacity when the offense took place. 
Id. It simply cannot be argued plausibly that an officer carrying out official duties or 
acting within the scope of his authority is on a personal frolic. 
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Based on the foregoing points and authorities this Court should rule that Officer 
Vu was acting within the scope of his authority as a police officer when appellant 
assaulted him. 
Point Two 
APPELLANT'S INTERWOVEN MENTAL ILLNESS DEFENSE 
ARGUMENT AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
ARGUMENT ARE NOT WELL-FOUNDED. 
Appellant's interwoven mental illness (or insanity) argument and ineffective 
assistance of counsel argument assumes there was evidence of mental illness, and 
requires a threshold finding of fact on appeal that appellant was mentally ill. Once 
appellant persuades this Court on appeal of that fact, appellant seeks to have this Court 
evaluate defense trial counsel's performance against that appellate finding of fact of 
mental illness, and thereafter to rule that trial counsel was ineffective by not raising the 
mental illness defense and by not objecting to the prosecutor's statement that the 
mental illness defense was not before the jury. Asking this Court to make a finding of 
fact on appeal and then asking this Court to evaluate trial counsel's performance in 
view of that appellate finding is not proper, and even if it were proper, there is no 
evidence in the record to suggest appellant was mentally ill (or insane) on the early 
morning in question. In addition, appellant has not perfected his appeal under Rule 
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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A. There is no evidence in the record to suggest appellant was mentally 
ill when he assaulted Officer Vu. 
Appellant, by claiming he was mentally ill, raises what used to be called the 
ir sanity defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(2). As a point of beginning this 
Court should look to the record to evaluate whether there is any evidence whatsoever 
that appellant was mentally ill when he assaulted Officer Vu, or whether appellant's 
raising this issue on appeal is a speculative assertion of facts on which the record is 
silent. The record speaks clearly that appellant was not mentally ill on the early 
morning in question. All of the following comes from appellant's own testimony at 
trial and is relevant to his mental state on the early morning in question: Appellant was 
capable of subtly gauging the strength of his pushes in the pushing contest with his 
brother that led up to his having his finger cut. (R155:157). Appellant got mad at 
having his finger cut, he did not get mentally ill. (Rl 55:157). Appellant was capable 
of forming the thought to show his mother, who had just entered the room, his finger 
and to simultaneously observe his brother leaving the room, (R155:158). Appellant 
was capable of distinguishing his thoughts of anger at his brother from his desire to 
have his cut finger attended to. (Rl 55:158). Appellant was capable of perceiving his 
own level of anger. (R155:159). Appellant was lucid enough to distinguish between 
people at the hospital. (155:159). Appellant, in his own words, was "just totally 
passive and peaceful" in what he claims was blind side surprise attack take down by 
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Officer Vu and others. Taking the higher ground by being peaceful in the face of 
supposed physical surprise attacks is not the response of a mentally ill person. 
Appellant was capable of identifying the exact anatomical place on his body - his 
kidneys - where his supposed surprise attackers were supposedly punching and kicking 
him. (R155:161). Appellant was capable of exercising his memory capacity by 
remembering his mother's words to his supposed surprise attackers. (R155:161). 
Appellant was cognizant enough of his medical condition to know he should elevate 
his finger while he was waiting for treatment. (Rl 55:162,). Appellant was capable of 
distinguishing whether or not conversations between the officers were humorous and 
in jest, and this was after the supposed surprise attack. (Rl 55:162). By Officer Vu's 
testimony and that of the admissions tech, Appellant was capable of determining which 
kind of professional assistance he needed, i.e., a doctor/medical services, not a 
cop/police services. (Rl55:82). 
The only evidence describing appellant which could remotely be strained to call 
into question appellant's mental state are those of some witnesses, not alienists or 
doctors, who without diagnosis casually used terms like shock, psychosis and 
hallucinations in colloquial terms. However, at sentencing appellant's counsel referred 
to the possible benefits of domestic violence counseling and alcohol counseling, with 
the suggestion that alcohol was at the root of some of appellant's aberrant behavior. 
26 
(Rl 55:204). Appellant himself attributed some of his conduct to "things that have 
been down inside of me that have ... bothered me." (R155:204). 
This is a far cry from the conclusions of a defendant's mental state a trial court 
sometimes reaches after full-blown competency proceedings involving multiple court-
appointed alienists to determine a defendant's mental state. See, e.g., State v. Laffertv, 
2001 UT 19, 20 P.3d 342. There is simply nothing in the record to which appellant 
can point, except for a speculative allegation of facts, not hinted at in the record, that 
defendant's mental state was a point of reasonable inquiry that trial counsel should 
have made. If people who engage in domestic violence, occasionally or habitually 
abuse alcohol, and/or have past life events that bother them and cause them anger are 
permitted to use the mental illness defense, it could be argued that a high percentage of 
the population of those charged with public offenses could use the mental illness 
defense. It is axiomatic that the criminal court dockets are full of parties who carry 
anger and get very upset at times but are not mentally ill. 
There should be no mistake, appellant was angry, lashing out with yelling and 
profanity at whoever was near him, whether it be his mother who brought him to the 
hospital, the admissions tech who tried to help him, Officer Vu who tried to calm him, 
the charge nurse who tried to calm him, after which he became physically threatening 
to those near him, but he was not mentally ill when he assaulted Officer Vu. 
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Importantly, Appellant "de-escalated, he had become calmer," (R155:119) 
which lends further support to the City's argument that Appellant's conduct was the 
result of a fit of temper and not mental illness. Officer Vu compared him to others 
who come in "irate and stuff, when they're demanding to see a family member's [sic] 
who's been in trauma." (Rl55:75). 
When a non-alienist or non-medical doctor uses terms like "hallucinations" that 
does not mean there is evidence of hallucination in the clinical sense of the word. 
Perhaps if there was evidence of audio hallucinations of loud freight train noises or 
tidal waves crashing noises that were not really there, or evidence of visual 
hallucinations of rotating heads or person-sized birds flying in the E.R., there might be 
reason for concern about hallucinations. But there is none of this, and casual and 
unfounded assertions of mental illness should not be recognized by this Court. It is 
absolutely clear that appellant, based on his own testimony cited above, did not think 
he was mentally ill or even hallucinating. 
Appellant is asking this Court on appeal to telescope down into the trial 
proceedings and find evidence and then make its own fact determination of bona fide 
mental illness that somehow was missed by an experienced trial judge, two 
experienced public defenders and appellant himself. Appellant is then further asking 
this Court to conclude that the non-existent evidence should have led defense trial 
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counsel to detect that appellant was laboring under "organic brain damage" or 
"delirium" or some other identifiable, diagnosable condition rendering him a danger to 
himself, or incapable of providing the necessities of life, n3 in need of hospital care 
rather than incarceration—all so as to exonerate or excuse defendant from the 
consequences of assaultive conduct. See State v. De Plonty, 749 P.2d 621,626 (Utah 
1987). 
In Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, 20 P.3d 382, |22, defendant raised an 
ineffectiveness claim based on failure to pursue a competency hearing, citing "(1) his 
bizarre behavior after arrest, (2) contradictions in the alienests' reports, i.e., findings 
that he was actively psychotic and otherwise mentally ill and yet competent to stand 
trial, and (3) the trial court's expressed willingness to conduct a competency hearing 
before proceeding to trial." IdL Yet the court still found "that it was reasonable for 
defense counsel to forego the competency hearing and allow Jacobs to plead guilty," 
f 24, and that those factors "fail[ed] to demonstrate that Jacobs's counsel's performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." IdL at f 23. 
In the instant case there is no evidence of bizarre post arrest behavior, no alienist 
reports and no expression from the trial court about a willingness to hold a competency 
hearing. While mental illness or insanity at the time an offense is committed is a 
n3 On this point it should be noted appellant was married for twenty-eight years 
and helped provide for his eight children. (R155:204). 
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different concept than competency to stand trial as discussed in Jacobs, counsel's 
decision on whether to assert mental illness or insanity as a defense should not be 
disturbed so long as it does not fall below an objective standard of reasonable 
profe jional judgment. 
In the instant case, where the City has cited ample evidence of appellant's 
positive mental state and ability to reason when he assaulted Officer Vu, his counsel's 
decision not to assert mental illness or insanity as a defense should not be disturbed. 
While appellant's behavior may have been bizarre, volatile or irrational, that does not 
mean he lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-305. 
B. Appellant's failure to meet the Rule 23B requirement should result in 
dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states in relevant part: 
Rule 23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to determination of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
(a) A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to remand the 
case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate 
court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion 
shall be available only upon a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination 
that counsel was ineffective. The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the 
appellant's brief. Upon a showing of good cause, Ihe court may permit a motion 
to be filed after the filing of the appellant's brief. 
(b).. . The motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts 
not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient 
performance of the attorney. The affidavits shall also allege facts that show the 
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claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient 
performance. The motion shall also be accompanied by a proposed order or 
remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues 
relevant to each such claim to be addressed on remand. 
Appellant has not filed a motion for a remand prior to filing his brief; has only 
cited speculative facts and colloquial references; has not filed any affidavits showing 
the claimed deficient performance of his trial counsel; has not filed a proposed order 
identifying the ineffectiveness claims and specifying the relevant factual issues to be 
addressed on remand; and appellant has not even alluded to an extant competency 
evaluation. 
Appellant's ineffectiveness argument that the mental illness defense was not 
raised and that defense trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's statement, 
therefore, should be dismissed by this Court because it has not been perfected. "Rule 
23B is directed to cases where some crucial factual information is absent from the 
record." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (UtahCt App. 1993), The crucial, absent 
information here is the complete dearth of evidence of defendant's supposed mental 
illness, and appellant should have sought this information prior to filing of his brief, 
but appellant could not because it does not exist. 
If this Court is considering entertaining appellant's good cause argument to 
permit a post-brief filing of a motion for a remand, the City argues against such a 
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remand because despite the voluminous record showing defendant may have anger, 
temper tantrum and alcohol difficulties, nothing comes close to showing mental illness 
contemplated by § 76-2-305, i.e., that he was insane on the early morning in question. 
Finally, even if appellant somehow has perfected this point of appeal, since there 
is no evidence of mental illness, trial defense counsel's failure to raise it as a defense 
and to object when the prosecutor said appellant's lack of memory and supposed 
hallucinations were not a defense, cannot be ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Point Three 
THE TRIAL PROSECUTOR DID NOT COMMIT PROSECUTOR 
MISCONDUCT. 
During trial defense counsel's closing argument she loosely argued that 
appellant may not have been able to form intent because he was hallucinating, a point 
which the City has disputed above. The trial prosecutor's sum total response to the 
vaguely hinted at but un-asserted mental illness defense was this: "Additionally, I want 
to point out to you that him, you know, not remembering that—what happened that day 
and him hallucinating, is—is not a defense for what occurred here today." 
(R155:197). That is the one sentence in the record upon which appellant bases his 
prosecutor misconduct allegation. 
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The trial prosecutor was correct on both points. Regarding the prosecutor's 
statement that appellant's not remembering was not a defense, the prosecutor was 
correct: "That a defendant is subsequently unable to remember is in itself no proof of 
his mental condition at the time the crime was committed/5 State v. Jenner, 451 
N.W.2d 710, 721 (S.D. 1990). If memory loss were a defense to a crime, every 
defendant could simply take the stand and testify they do not remember the events 
giving rise to their charges and thereby be acquitted. 
That leaves the words "him hallucinating" as the entire basis of appellant's 
prosecutor misconduct claim. However, the prosecutor was also correct on this point. 
The law of the case at trial was that mental illness was not affirmatively raised and 
developed as a defense, either by defense counsel or as reflected in the jury 
instructions. Appellant's supposed hallucinations, a word used casually by a non-
alienist, non-medical doctor witness who did not diagnose appellant, was not a defense 
in the case. An accurate statement of the law of the case cannot possibly give rise to a 
prosecutor misconduct claim. 
Even if mental illness somehow was an affirmative defense at issue in this trial 
that was simply missed by the trial judge, the defense counsel and the prosecutor—and 
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not reflected in the record including the jury instructions—the prosecutor's statement 
about "his hallucinations" not being a defense was cured by the trial judge. 
This Court will reverse for prosecutor misconduct only if appellant has shown 
that (1) "the actions or remarks of prosecuting counsel call to the attention of the jury a 
matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, if so, (2) 
under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial and 
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would 
have been a more favorable result." State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928-29 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). 
Misstating the law meets the first step of the above test. Id at 929. Regarding 
the prejudice step, the trial judge cured the misstatement when he said: "If either 
lawyer's arguments include statements of the law which differ from the law which I've 
given you, you should disregard such statements and rely entirely on the law as given 
to you by the Court." (Rl 55:174). Such a curative instruction was given and held to 
be curative in Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 929-30 ("misstatements of the law do not 
prejudice a defendant where the error has been satisfactorily corrected.") 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the prosecutor's statement could somehow be 
construed as informing the jury that intent (as opposed to mental illness) was not an 
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element or fact issue, which would be legally incorrect for the offenses charged, that 
statement was cured by the jury instructions relating to intent. See Jury Instructions 
11-13 as read by the trial judge. (R155:174-178). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points, authorities and arguments, the trial court's ruling 
that Officer Vu was acting within the scope of his employment should be upheld. 
Further, appellant's claim that trial defense counsel was ineffective by failing to assert 
a mental illness defense should be rejected because appellant has failed to perfect his 
appeal on this point, and because of the voluminous facts in the record showing that 
appellant was not mentally ill when he assaulted Officer Vu. Finally, the prosecutor's 
statement to the effect that the mental illness defense was not at issue, was not 
prosecutor misconduct since mental illness was, in fact, not an issue at trial. Even if it 
had been an issue, the trial court cured the prosecutor's alleged misstatement. 
Respectfully submitted this f """gay of June 2006. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM "A 
Statutes 
76-2-305. Mental illness - Use as a defense - Influence of alcohol or other 
substance voluntarily consumed - Definition. 
(1) (a) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the 
defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of 
the offense charged. 
(b) Mental illness is not otherwise a defense, but may be evidence in mitigation of the 
penalty in a capital felony under Section 76-3-207 and may be evidence of special 
mitigation reducing the level of a criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide 
offense under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the defenses known as "insanity" and 
"diminished mental capacity." 
(3) A person who asserts a defense of insanity or diminished mental capacity, and who 
is under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or ingested alcohol, controlled 
substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not excused from 
criminal responsibility on the basis of mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, 
triggered, or substantially contributed to the mental illness. 
(4) (a) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect that substantially impairs a 
person's mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A mental defect may be a 
congenital condition, the result of injury, or a residual effect of a physical or mental 
disease and includes, but is not limited to, mental retardation. 
(b) "Mental illness" does not mean an abnormality manifested primarily by repeated 
criminal conduct. 
(5) "Mental retardation" means a significant subaverage general intellectual 
functioning, existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested prior 
to age 22. 
Amended by Chapter 11, 2003 General Session 
76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer - Penalty. 
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace officer, 
and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or another correctional 
facility, a minimum of: 
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and 
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense. 
(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence required under 
Subsection (2) if the court finds that the interests of justice would be best served and 
makes specific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the record. 
Amended by Chapter 172, 1998 General Session 
76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to 
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to 
another. 
Amended by Chapter 109, 2003 General Session 
Addenda "B" 
Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Page 1 of 1 
Rule 23B, Motion to remand for findings necessary to determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
(a) Grounds for motion time A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to remand the case to the trial 
court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculatsve allegation of facts not fully appearing in the record 
on appeal which if true could support a determination that counsel was ineffective 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit 
a motion to be filed after the filing of the appellant's brief In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed after 
oral argument Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at 
any time if the claim has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party 
(b) Content of motion, response, reply The content of the motion shall conform to the requirements of Rule 23 The 
motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that 
show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney The affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed 
prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance The motion shall also be 
accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues 
relevant to each such claim to be addressed on remand 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed The response shall include a proposed order of 
remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be 
addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the responding party accepts that proposed by the 
moving party Any reply shall be filed within 10 days after the response is filed 
(c) Order of the court If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule have been met the court may order that the 
case be temporarily remanded to the tnal court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel The order of remand shall identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual 
issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the tnal court The order shall also direct the trial court to 
complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of remand, absent a finding by the trial 
court of good cause for a delay of reasonable length 
if st appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon 
remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained 
(d) Effect on appeal Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand 
under this rule Other procedural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand unless a 
stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties or upon the court's motion 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand the trial court shall promptly conduct hearings and take evidence 
as necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel Any 
claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, 
unless the trial court determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not 
specifically identified in the order of remand Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as 
practicable after remand The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact The standard of proof 
shall be a preponderance of the evidence The trial court shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed 
deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result in accordance with the 
order of remand Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the 
trial court finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record At the conclusion of all proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the 
tnal court and the court reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required by 
these rules If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, 
the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of 
the supplemental record If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the 
appellate court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon the preparation of 
the entire record 
(g) Appellate court determination Upon receipt of the record from the trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the 
parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument under these rules Errors claimed to have been made during 
the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of 
errors in other appeals The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as 
the review of findings of fact in other appeals 
